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EMPLOYING ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION:
WORKING AT FINDING BETTER WAYS TO RESOLVE
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE STRIFE
GEORGE H. SINGER*
Employment litigation is a little like holy war and a
lot like divorce. Both sides are so convinced their
cause is just that compromise is possible only when
litigants are convinced that trial will not produce
justice. Delay favors the deep pocket. Before the
settlement, legal fees mount, but the money holder
gets an interest free loan. Not surprisingly, where
liability insurers are the real party in interest, settle-
ments generally occur only on the eve of trial after all
possible income has been earned.
Artful lawyers fight to get their client the biggest
piece of a dead relationship. The drama settles only
in the final act when contestants fear a tragic conclu-
sion.)
I. INTRODUCTION
The legal climate surrounding the resolution of employment re-
lated disputes in the United States is markedly changing. 2 Indeed, the
widespread concern over this country's litigation explosion has in recent
years spawned the search for a better way to resolve problems emanating
from the employer-employee relationship. A large number of employ-
ers are endeavoring to transfer the adjudication of disputes pertaining to
Mr. Singer is associated with the Minneapolis. Minnesota law firm of Lindquist & Vennum,
where his practice focuses on corporate and commercial law. including securities, mergers and
acquisitions, business reorganizations, and bankruptcy. Mr. Singer formerly served as Judicial Law
Clerk to the Honorable Nancy C. Dreher, United States Bankruptcy Court. District of Minnesota and
Judicial Law Clerk to the Honorable William A. Hill, United States Bankruptcy Court, District of North
Dakota.
The author gratefully acknowledges the insightful comments and assistance of the Honorable
Connie S. Portscheller, Juvenile Referee, Minot, N.D. with an earlier draft of this article.
I. Peter M. Panken et al., Avoiding Employment Litigation: Alternative Dispute Resolution of
Employment Disputes in the 90's, in A.L.I.-A.B .A. COURSE OF STUDY IN ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW
AND LMrATION. C779 A.L.I. A.B.A. 63,65 (1992).
2. The traditional common law employment-at-will doctrine, which gave the employer the
unfettered right to terminate employees who were not hired for a specified term, and thereby shielded
employers from suit for wrongful termination, has given way to a number of statutory and judicial
exceptions. See generally George H. Singer, Wrongful Discharge: Issues and Answers (1993)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the author) (discussing the employment-at-will doctrine and its
amelioration by various exceptions which include: exceptions based on public policy, implied in fact
contract claims, various tort claims, and claims based upon a breach of implied covenants of good
faith and fair dealing).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 72:299
the employment relationship from the courtroom and its jury system to
varying systems of alternative dispute resolution [hereinafter ADR].
ADR processes 3 offer unique mechanisms by which existing employ-
ment related disputes can be settled and the development of future
disputes can be prevented. 4 Despite the fact that ADR is a generic term
that has no generally accepted theoretical or abstract definition, it does
have a fundamental premise upon which most agree: "[I1t is worthwhile
both to reduce the costs of resolving disputes, however this can be
accomplished, and to improve the quality of the final outcome." 5
3. Jethro K. Lieberman & James F. Henry, Lessons from the Alternative Dispute Resolution
Movement, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 424, 424 (1986). The roster of ADR processes include: arbitration,
mediation, conciliation, negotiation, and hybrid devices such as the mini-trial, mediation-arbitration,
and the summary jury trial. Id.
4. Stephen A. Mazurak. Alternative Dispute Resolution of Employment Claims: Exclusivity,
Exhaustion, and Preclusion, 64 U. DEr. L. REv. 623.623 n.l (1987). Although there can be little doubt
that the popularity of ADR has skyrocketed in recent years, it should be noted that the concepts of
arbitration and mediation are age-old concepts which have existed since at least biblical times, Id.
5. Lieberman & Henry, supra note 3. at 425. A number of definitions of ADR have, however,
emerged which may serve as the starting point for discussion:
ADR is a set of practices and techniques that aim (1) to permit legal disputes to be
resolved outside the courts for the benefit of all disputants; (2) to reduce the cost of
conventional litigation and the delays to which it is ordinarily subject; or (3) to prevent
legal disputes that would otherwise likely be brought to the courts.
Id. at 425-26. One of the leading critics of ADR, by contrast, has impliedly defined ADR to mean the
creation of pressures or incentives that force settlement upon litigants to a dispute. Owen M. Fiss, Out
of Eden, 94 YALE LJ. 1669, 1670 (1985). See generally Honorable Rodney S. Webb, Court-Annexed
"ADR"-A Dissent, 70 N.D. L. REV. 229 (1994). Judge Webb has recently opined, and this author
fully agrees, that although the alternatives to the civil jury trial have a place in the resolution of
disputes, such devices should not be forced upon parties through court-annexed ADR:
The jury trial contemplates a definitive answer to a dispute-a clear
winner. On the other hand, arbitration and mediation always look to
compromise or middle ground and operate from what I believe to be a false
premise-that the parties to a dispute are never either clearly right or
absolutely wrong. Certainly, the civil jury resolution process encourages
(but does not mandate) compromise by way of settlement when issues are
not clear. In fact, most cases are settled. There is, however, the
recognition by litigants that the case will have a clearly defined end when a
jury decides the issue. Mandatory court-annexed ADR will, I believe
encourage litigants to inflate initial demands when they recognize that
"middle ground" is always the goal of ADR.
It appears at first blush that the function of both ADR and a civil jury
trial is the resolution of a controversy. In a limited sense, that is true. In
reality, however, ADR and civil jury trials (and so. traditionally, the courts)
serve two very different and distinct functions. Alternative dispute
resolution programs function solely to aid parties to resolve disputes. The
courts, through the process of the civil jury trial, however, also protect the
public interest, enforce public policy, educate and engage citizens in the
democratic process, find the truth and protect principle. All of this is so
much more than a resolution to an individual controversy. The traditional
civil jury trial system assures the citizens of this country that each of them is
entitled to have their rights vindicated-to have "their day in court." For




Although no one ADR approach is the best for resolving all disputes,
arbitration is the most widely accepted and utilized procedure for
resolving issues that arise in the context of employment related disputes.
Moreover, arbitration agreements are becoming increasingly common-
place and present viable solutions for dealing with problems which are
peculiar to the workplace. 6
There are many practical and legal considerations for both the
employee and employer regarding the application of any ADR proce-
dure to the resolution of employment related disputes. ADR provides
employers with a procedure that is generally a cheaper and more effi-
cient means by which to settle a dispute without the potential for the
adverse publicity associated with litigation.7 Additionally, manage-
ment's credibility with its employees may be augmented by the utiliza-
tion of equitable grievance or ADR procedures. Similarly, a grievance
or ADR procedure often enables "employees" to acquire meaningful
redress of their employment related disputes without being compelled to
resort to potentially lengthy and costly litigation.
Regardless of each party's motivation or the ADR method em-
ployed, a number of conditions must exist in order for employees and
employers to realize the potential benefits of the ADR process. For
example, the employer must be assured that the resulting determination
of the ADR procedure will preclude an employee from subsequently
obtaining judicial relief for claims which stem from events arising from
that same employment relationship. Stated differently, a crucial concern
for employers is whether the employed ADR procedure will be treated
by the judiciary as an employee's exclusive remedy or as merely an
6. Alex Friend, State Litigators Watching as Arbitration Zooms as Fastest Growing Legal Trend. 7
WARFIELD'S B uss RECORD 44, § 1, at 21 (Nov. 6, 1992). "'If there's any one class of potential
litigation that has the incentive and the need to use arbitration agreements, it's employer-employee
relationships, primarily due to the prolific nature of suits filed against companies ... .' Id. (quoting
Leonard Pazulski, an attorney with Baltimore's Weinberg and Green). Indeed, the perception by
employers that juries are unpredictable, frequently decide cases on the basis of sympathy rather than
legal merit, and that jurors are essentially the peers of employees, fuels the fear of skyrocketing
awards. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide to
Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 593 (1995).
7. It is significant to note that the employment-at-will doctrine may not apply to the relationship
between employers and employees who agree to arbitrate their disputes: The employer's relationship
with its employee specifically
contemplated the use of the arbitration procedure as a means of settling employment-
related disputes. This process necessarily alters the employment relationship from at-will
to something else-some standard of discernable cause is inherently required in this
context where an arbitration panel is called on to interpret the employment relationship.
If [the employee's] relationship was purely at-will, the arbitration procedure designed to
interpret that employment relationship would serve no identifiable purpose.
Painewebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347, 352 (8th Cit. 1995).
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adjunct to the judicial process. 8 A prevailing employer will only experi-
ence a momentary victory if it is required to litigate the issue again in a
judicial forum. Moreover, employees may question whether the ADR
procedure has any real substance if the resolution of the employment
related dispute will be determined solely by an employer controlled
dispute resolution method. As such, prior to agreeing to waive any
potential judicial action which may stem from the employment relation-
ship, an employee will want to be assured that the ADR procedure will
not be a "mere rubber-stamp of the employer's employment decisions
and provides the employee with his 'day in court' before a neutral
decision maker." 9 Additionally, employees need adequate assurance
that a favorable ADR determination will be enforced by courts without
the necessity of further adjudication.
A number of legal issues necessarily arise which go to the heart of
the aforementioned concerns. If ADR processes are to be useful, other
than as ad hoc anomalies, the concepts of exclusivity, exhaustion,
preclusion, enforcement of statutory claims, and judicial review must be
considered. This article, while not providing an exhaustive legal analysis,
attempts to discuss each of these issues in a comprehensible fashion and
highlights certain areas of concern.
II. DISCUSSION
A. EXCLUSIVITY
At common law, the courts were generally quite reluctant to specifi-
cally enforce an executory agreement to arbitrate.10 Courts found a
natural repugnance to arbitration agreements which essentially "ousted
the jurisdiction" of the judiciary, which was the traditional forum for
dispute resolution.ll In order to overcome this common law aversion,
8. Mark Berger, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Practices, Policies and Sanctions,
10 HoFsTRA LAB. LJ. 245, 248 (1992). Indeed, any ADR mechanism utilized to resolve a labor dispute
which does not result in a conclusive ruling only adds "to the expense, delay and disruption of the
dispute resolution process. In such an environment, [ADR] would amount to a largely superfluous
additional step which the parties would be likely to omit or not take seriously if they knew the outcome
did not really matter." Id.
9. Joel Glanstein et al., Report of Committee on Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective
Bargaining Agreements, Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 6 LAB.
LAW. 805,806 (1990).
10. Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1984); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co.,
264 U.S. 109, 120-21 (1924).
11. 5 AM. JUR. 2DArbitration & Award § 36, at 547 (1962). An executory agreement to arbitrate
present or future differences was not enforced by the courts under the common law. Id. § 71, at
572-73. See Insurance Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (holding that prospective
extrajudicial agreements to arbitrate usurp the jurisdiction of the courts and are, therefore, illegal and
unenforceable); Cocalis v. Nazlides, 139 N.E. 95, 98-99 (I11, 1923) (finding an executory agreement
to arbitrate to be void).
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the federal and the majority of state governments have promulgated
statutes which provide for the specific enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments. 12 These statutory provisions generally provide for the specific
enforcement of the duty of the parties to arbitrate, as well as provide for
the vacation or enforcement of the arbitrator's award once it has been
issued.13 Most statutes provide the arbitrator with subpoena power and
set forth other rules of procedure such as the selection of an arbitrator
and discovery provisions.1 4 Additionally, a number of United States
Supreme Court decisions in the employment law arena are demonstrative
12. See 9 U.S.C. §§ I to 208 (1994) (Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) (enacted in 1925)). See also
ALA. CODE §§ 6-6-1 to -16 (1977); ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.43.010 to .080 (1994) (Uniform Arbitration
Act); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1501 to -1518 (1994) (Uniform Arbitration Act); ARK. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-108-201 to -224 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995) (Uniform Arbitration Act); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§§ 1280-1294.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-22-201 to -223 (1987 & Supp.
1995) (Uniform Arbitration Act); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 5701-5725 (1975) (Uniform Arbitration
Act); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-4301 to -4319 (1989) (Uniform Arbitration Act); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§
682.01 to -.22 (West 1990) (Florida Arbitration Code); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 7-101 to -214 (Harrison
1989); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 658-1 to -15 (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 7-901 to -922 (1990) (Uniform
Arbitration Act); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 710, para. 5/1 to 5/23 (Smith-Hurd 1992) (Uniform Arbitration
Act); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-4-2-1 to -22 (Bums 1986) (Uniform Arbitration Act); IOWA CODE ANN. §§
679A.1-.19 (West Supp. 1987) (Uniform Arbitration Act); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 5-401 to -422 (1991)
(Uniform Arbitration Act); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4201 to :4217 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 14, §§ 5927-5949 (West 1980); MD. CrS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -234 (1995); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 251, §§ 1-19 (West 1988) (Uniform Arbitration Act); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§
600.5001 to .5035 (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 572.08-.30 (West 1988) (Uniform
Arbitration Act); Mtss. CODE ANN. §§ 11-15-1 to -37 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 435.350-.470 (Vernon
1992) (Uniform Arbitration Act); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 27-5-111 to -324 (1995) (Uniform Arbitration
Act); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-2601 to -2622 (1989) (Uniform Arbitration Act); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
38.015-205 (1986) (Uniform Arbitration Act); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 614.010-080 (1986) (Labor
Arbitration Act); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 542:1 to :11 (1974 & Supp. 1995) (General Arbitration
Act); NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:24-1 to -11 (West 1987 & Supp. 1995 ) (General Arbitration Act); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7-1 to -22 (Michie 1978) (Uniform Arbitration Act); N.Y. CIV. PRAC. L. & R. §§
7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.1 to .20 (1983) (Uniform
Arbitration Act); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-29.2-01 to -20 (Supp. 1995); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§
2711.01 to .16 (Page 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 801-818 (West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§
36.300 to .425 (1995); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7301 to 7320 (1982) (Uniform Arbitration Act); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 10-3-1 to -21 (1985 & Supp. 1995) (Arbitration Act); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 15-48-10 to
-240 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995) (Uniform Arbitration Act); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25A-1 to
-38 (1987 & Supp. 1995) (Uniform Arbitration Act); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301 to -320 (Supp.
1995) (Uniform Arbitration Act); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. §§ 171.001 to .023 (West Supp. 1996);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-31a-! to -20 (1992) (Utah Arbitration Act); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§
5651-5681 (Supp. 1995) (Vermont Arbitration Act); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-581.01 to -581.016
(Michie 1992) (Uniform Arbitration Act); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 7.04.010 to .220 (West 1992); W.
VA. CODE §§ 55-10-1 to -8 (1994); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 788.01 to .18 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995); WYo.
STAT. §§ 1-36-101 to -119 (1988) (Uniform Arbitration Act). Arbitration statutes that alter a party's
substantive and procedural common law rights have been upheld against numerous constitutional
challenges. See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 279 (1932) (holding that arbitration of
a maritime contract does not violate constitutional provisions vesting judicial power in constituted
courts); Finsilver, Sill & Moss, Inc. v. Goldberg, Maas & Co., 171 N.E. 579,583 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1930)
(holding that arbitration does not violate due process).
13. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-02 (Supp. 1995) (setting forth proceedings to compel or
stay arbitration); id. § 32-29.2-12 (vacating the arbitrator's award); id § 32-29.2-11 (providing for the
confirmation of the arbitrator's award).
14. See. e.g., id. § 32-29.2-07 (providing for the issuance of subpoenas and discovery); id. §
32-29.2-03 (providing for the appointment of arbitrators).
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of the fact that there is a judicial, as well as statutory, acceptance of
arbitration as a means of resolving employment related disputes. As a
result of these statutes and decisions, arbitration agreements in the realm
of employment matters have increased in popularity and received
extensive judicial attention. 15
Courts will generally enforce written agreements between employees
and employers that provide for final and binding arbitration of disputes
which arise out of the employment relationship. Moreover, courts
generally hold that the remedy afforded by the agreed upon arbitration
procedure will be the exclusive remedy available for the resolution of
that particular employment dispute. This rule generally applies with
equal force to suits which sound in either contract or tort.16
The genesis of arbitration is its voluntariness. As such, a court must
find that the parties have contractually agreed to arbitrate their dispute
before it may find that a remedy provided by arbitration is exclusive. 17
Moreover, a court will not defer to arbitration unless there is affirmative
evidence which establishes that the parties to the dispute expressly agreed
that arbitration would be the method of dispute resolution.1 8 The
15. Mazurak, supra note 4, at 627. "The use of ADRs as an exclusive remedy has received
much greater attention by courts, especially if the ADR provides for final and binding arbitrations."
Id.
16. Glanstein et al., supra note 9, at 809. In most jurisdictions, arbitration will be enforced as the
exclusive remedy if the type of injury alleged was contemplated by the parties as falling within the
scope of the agreement to arbitrate. Id. See Williams v. Katten. Muchin & Zavis, 837 F. Supp. 1430
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (involving intentional infliction of emotional distress); Lang v. Burlington N. R.R. Co.,
835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993) (dealing with wrongful termination); Carlson v. Hutzel Corp., 455
N.W.2d 335 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990) (involving constructive discharge). Additionally, most courts will
resolve all doubts regarding the scope of an agreement to arbitrate in favor of arbitration. See Local
Union No. 884 v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 61 F.3d 1347, 1352-53 (8th Cir. 1995), Zolezzi v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc., 789 F.2d 1447, 1449 (9th Cir. 1986); Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d
790,795 (Minn. 1995).
17. AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).
Generally, courts have declared statutes providing for "compulsory arbitration" that have the effect of
coercing parties to submit to arbitration without any agreement or assent on their part to be
unconstitutional. See Chas. Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923)
(depriving the parties of liberty and property without due process of law); In re Smith, 112 A.2d 625,
629-30 (Pa. 1955), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 858 (1955) (depriving parties of the constitutional right
to a trial by jury).
18. Waldron v. Goddess, 461 N.E.2d 273, 274 (N.Y. 1984). "[Alrbitration is a matter of contract
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration [of] any dispute which he has not agreed to
submit." AT&T Technologies, 475 U.S. at 648. See Bridgestone, 61 F.3d at 1352 (quoting AT & T
Technologies, 475 U.S. at 648); Midwest Mech. Contractors, Inc. v. Commonwealth Constr. Co., 801
F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir. 1986) (concluding that it is incumbent upon the court to determine whether the
issues raised are within the reach of the agreement between the parties to arbitrate); Law
Enforcement Labor Servs.. Inc. v. City of Moorhead, 348 N.W.2d 405, 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)
(stating that the right to aribitrate is governed by contract and whether to arbitrate must be determined
by the parties' intent, which is found in the language of the agreement); West Fargo Pub. Sch. Dist. v.
West Fargo Educ. Ass'n, 259 N.W.2d 612, 617 (N.D. 1977) (opining that arbitration is a matter of
contract and, as such, parties are only required to arbitrate those issues which they have contractually
agreed to arbitrate).
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agreement to arbitrate must be "clear, explicit and unequivocal and must
not depend upon implication or subtlety."19 Additionally, the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA)20 and most state arbitration statutes require that
any agreement to arbitrate be in writing in order to be enforceable. 21
Thus, arbitration affords parties the right to control the resolution of
both present and prospective disputes arising out of the employment
relationship by paying careful attention to the language of the agree-
ment. The parties may narrowly limit arbitrability or, alternatively, may
comprehensively provide that all disputes arising from the relation may
be referable to arbitration.2 2 The foregoing principles demonstrate that
arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes solely from a volun-
tary agreement by both the employer and employee to have their
grievance arbitrated.
The extent to which an arbitration agreement may be binding upon
an employee and employer hinges upon the enforceability of the
agreement to arbitrate. Since the question of a duty to arbitrate is
contractual, the intent of the parties is dispositive and an employee is
entitled to raise any and all of the typical contractual defenses when
challenging the enforceability of an arbitration agreement. 23 Indeed,
19. Waldron. 461 N.E.2d at 274 (citations omitted).
20. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
21. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-01 (Supp. 1995).
22. Schmidt v. Midwest Family Mut. Ins., 426 N.W.2d 870, 872 n.2 (Minn. 1988).
23. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1995) (arbitration agreements under the FAA are enforceable "save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract"). The Supreme Court has
reminded lower courts to "'remain attuned to well-supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate
resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds for the
revocation of any contract."' Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991)
(quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Chrysler-Plymouth. Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985)). Among the
grounds for revoking a contract under state law-fraud, duress, mistake, unconscionability-the most
relevant for employees attempting to avoid a compulsory arbitration agreement after signing it is the
assertion that the contract is one of adhesion. Case law suggests. however, that agreements containing
boiler-plate language requiring the arbitration of employment related disputes are not adhesion
contracts simply because they are drafted by the more powerful party and required as a condition of
employment. See Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1154 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1046 (1993) (opining that adhesion contracts are not automatically void;
the party seeking to avoid the contract must demonstrate its unconscionability); Mago v. Shearson
Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that state law adhesion principles
may not be invoked to bar the arbitration of disputes under the FAA); Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, 888 F.2d 696,700 (10th Cir. 1989) (finding the boiler-plate nature of a contract not to
be a sufficient basis for dissolving the terms of the parties' agreement to arbitrate); Lang v. Burlington
N. R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104, 1106 (D. Minn. 1993) (holding that the mere inequality of bargaining
power is not grounds for finding the agreement to arbitrate to be unenforceable; there must be proof
that the agreement resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would
provide grounds for revoking any contract). See generally David v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 269, 274 (N.D. 1989) (finding that where the language of a contract clearly
and unequivocally provides for arbitration, the contract is not one of adhesion and it is no defense that
it was not read). At least one court has even gone so far as to reject an employee's argument of
adhesion when the employee was required to sign an arbitration agreement as a condition of
continuing in the employment. See Griffith Lab. U.S.A., Inc. v. Pomper, 577 F. Supp. 903, 906
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courts will generally scrutinize contractual defenses which challenge an
alleged arbitration agreement with greater deference than defenses to
other contractual provisions. 24
In order for an arbitration agreement to be enforceable, the arbitra-
tion provision must generally be included in a contract that has not
expired. 25 Consequently, an employee may often successfully avoid
arbitration and institute judicial action if the agreement which provided
for arbitration has expired. 26 This proposition holds true even if the
employee remains employed by the same employer. It is also significant
to note that the right to arbitration may be waived if not raised in a
timely fashion.27
Employees may also contest the enforceability of an arbitration
clause to a contract by challenging the mutuality of obligation. Al-
though some jurisdictions recognize unilateral contracts, a fundamental
tenet of contract law rests upon the view than an agreement is enforce-
able "only if both parties to the contract have agreed to legally bind
themselves to the agreed upon terms. An agreement to arbitrate must
therefore be equally binding upon the employer and the employee." 28
B. EXHAUSTION
If the arbitration procedure utilized is nonexclusive, nonbinding
arbitration for instance, courts will inevitably be confronted with the
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), aft'd, 740 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1984) (ruling that contract was binding despite claim that
threat of discharge rose to level of economic duress, making agreement void).
24. Waldron v. Goddess, 461 N.E.2d 273, 275-76 (N.Y. 1984) (stating that "the threshold for
clarity of an agreement to arbitrate is greater than with respect to other contractual terms") (citing In
re Doughboy Indus., 17 A.2d 216,219 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962)).
25. See Coudert v. Paine Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 705 F.2d 78, 82 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that
there is no duty to arbitrate a grievance which arises after the termination of the contract between an
employee and employer, even if the expired contract contained an arbitration clause). See also Local
Union No. 884 v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 61 F.3d 1347, 1353 (8th Cir. 1995) (indicating that a
dispute which arises after a contract has expired is subject to the arbitration provision in the expired
contract only in very limited circumstances such as "where, under normal principals of contract
interpretation, the disputed contractual right survives the expiration of the remainder of the
agreement") (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190,206 (1991)). But see Zolezzi v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 789 F.2d 1447. 1450-51 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding a claim based upon
defamation which occurred after the contract termination to be arbitrable since it arose from the
employment relationship).
26. Waldron, 461 N.E.2d at 275-76.
27. American Family Mut. Ins. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 504 N.W.2d 307, 308 n.2 (N.D. 1993). See
N.D. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (requiring a defendant-employer to plead arbitration as an affirmative defense in
its answer). Cf. Helmerichs v. Bank of Minneapolis & Trust Co., 349 N.W.2d 326,327 (Minn. Ct. App.
1984) (opining that a party may lose his or her right to "object" to arbitration as the method of dispute
resolution by actually participating in an arbitration proceeding without objecting).
28. Glanstein et al.. supra note 9, at 807. See Hull v. Norcom. Inc.. 750 F.2d 1547, 1550 (11 th
Cir. 1985). The court in Hull found than employer's reciprocal promise to arbitrate constituted the
necessary consideration for the employee's agreement to arbitrate. Id. As such, an arbitration clause
which requires an employee to arbitrate all employment disputes will not be enforced if the contract
provides the employer with the option of whether or not to proceed to arbitration. Id.
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issue of whether the particular arbitration procedure must be exhausted
as a prerequisite to, or even in lieu of, the commencement of a civil
lawsuit. The notion of exhaustion of nonexclusive ADR processes, as a
prerequisite to the initiation of the judicial machinery, has not been the
subject of extensive analysis or legal review. This lack of analysis or
review can perhaps be explained by the fact that a large number of
nonexclusive ADR processes are relatively novel, at least in a structured
or formal sense.
An analogous issue which has received some judicial attention is the
requirement in some employment contracts which contain nonexclusive
arbitration clauses that an employee provide the employer with written
notice of any employment related claim as a prerequisite to the institu-
tion of judicial action. Although not uniformly upheld in all cases,
notice provisions in contracts as a precondition to judicial action have
been enforced. 29
For example, the Alaska Supreme Court in Inman v. Clyde Hall
Drilling Co.,30 upheld a clause in an employment contract which re-
quired notice to the employer within thirty days of any claim coupled
with a six-month abatement before suit as condition precedents to court
action. 31 Since the employee failed to comply with the conditions, the
court dismissed the employee's suit for breach of an employment
contract.3 2 In enforcing the contractual provisions, the court held that a
contrary result would permit parties to escape their contractual obliga-
tions. 33
Despite cases like Inman, the issue of whether employment contracts
which require the exhaustion of nonbinding adjudication of employee
claims prior to the institution of legal action will be enforced remains
unsettled. In all likelihood, however, courts confronted with the issue
will enforce such agreements and compel employees to exhaust the ADR
procedure before instituting legal action, assuming that the employee
suffers no prejudice as a result of this requirement. The Supreme Court,
although not directly addressing the precise issue in the non-union
29. Glanstein et al., supra note 9. at 811. A small number of states have statutory or constitutional
provisions which preclude the requirement of notice as a prerequisite to judicial action, See id.
30. 369 P.2d 498 (Alaska 1962).
31. Inman v. Clyde Hall Drilling Co., 369 P.2d 498, 501 (Alaska 1962). The matter in Inman
came before the court on appeal from a summary judgment motion that was granted in favor of the
employer. Id. at 499.
32. Id. at 501. The court rejected the employee's argument that the contractual provision was
violative of public policy and should be stricken. Id.
33. id. See Powell v. Oman Constr. Co., 25 A.2d 566, 567 (N.Y. 1966) (finding a 60-day notice
of claim provision to be an additional basis for granting summary judgment in favor of the employer).
See also Annotation, Provision in Employment Contract Requiring Written Notice Before Instituting
Action, 4 A.L.R.3d 439,441 (1965).
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context, has historically required employees to exhaust their remedies
and submit to the established grievance procedure as a precondition to
the institution of a civil action on claims under a variety of federal
statutes. 34
C. PRECLUSION
Perhaps the most frequently litigated and central issue which arises
in an arbitration procedure is whether an arbitrator's determination will
preclude the employee or the employer from pursuing a different
outcome in a subsequent judicial action. The issue of preclusion arises
when (1) an employee attempts to maintain a cause of action based on
the same factual circumstances which has previously been adjudicated
adversely to the employee in the arbitration; or (2) an employee seeks to
enforce a favorable arbitration award in court and asserts that the em-
ployer is barred from relitigating the decision of the arbitrator. Obvi-
ously, the greatest perceived benefit of a binding arbitration procedure
for resolving employment disputes is the possibility that the results of an
arbitrator will preclude subsequent litigation over the same issues or
claims that were previously addressed and resolved. At least one court
has encouraged such a perception by indicating that an employer may
avoid the perceived perils of the jury system by providing for alternative
methods of resolving disputes in a written agreement. 35 For example, an
agreement providing for a definite term and to discharge only for cause
could also provide for binding arbitration as the mechanism for resolv-
ing issues of cause as well as damages. 36
Substantively, an arbitration award will preclude inconsistent judicial
action if:
(1) the . . . arbitration procedure ended with a "final and
binding" award;
(2) there is no "scheme of remedies" that permits an asser-
tion of a second claim (i.e., there is no federal or state statutory
claim);
(3) the parties' arbitration agreement does not limit the
binding effect of the award or provide that judicial action may
be taken notwithstanding the arbitral award. 37
34. See, e.g., Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 692 (1981) (indicating that the employer should
have been afforded the opportunity to investigate and resolve the employee's claims under the
procedure established without judicial interference); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650.
652 (1965) (requiring the aggrieved employee to exhaust the grievance procedure agreed upon by the
union and employer as the mode of redress before instituting a lawsuit).
35. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 292 N.W.2d 880,897 (Mich. 1980).
36. Id.
37. Glanstein et al., supra note 9, at 812.
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Additionally, an arbitration procedure will preclude subsequent
judicial action only if it satisfies certain procedural prerequisites which
include:
(1) adequate notice to the employees bound by the proce-
dure;
(2) the right of the employee to present evidence and legal
arguments in support of his [or her] contentions and a fair
opportunity to rebut the employer's evidence;
(3) a formulation of the issues of law and facts to be deter-
mined in the particular ... arbitration; and
(4) a rule of finality whereby the arbitration yields a final deci-
sion.38
In other words, persons whose rights are affected by arbitration
must be given a meaningful opportunity to be heard. An arbitration
proceeding is not, however, a court of law and when contracting parties
agree to have their dispute submitted to arbitration, they relinquish the
right to certain procedural niceties that are typically associated with a
trial. 39
Upon the satisfaction of the aforementioned substantive and proce-
dural prerequisites, the decision of the arbitrator will preclude any
judicial action which is inconsistent with the arbitrator's award. General-
ly, when parties have submitted a dispute to arbitration, which has
substantive and procedural safeguards, and the claim has been ruled on
by the arbitrator, the award has the same efficacy of a judgment, com-
pletely settles the dispute between the parties, and, as long as it remains
standing, precludes the party against whom it was rendered from resort-
ing to any action at law to enforce his or her claim.4 0 An arbitrator's
award will thus be fully enforceable in court and will be subject only to
limited judicial review.4 1 If the above requirements are not met, however,
38. Id.
39. Burton v. Bush, 614 F.2d 389. 390 (4th Cir. 1980) (finding there to be no right to pretrial
discovery).
40. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-14 (Supp. 1995) (providing that an arbitration award may
"be enforced as any other judgment or decree").
41. Id. An employer which desires to create a dispute resolution mechanism which would best
fulfill the requirements for ensuring preclusivity would be well advised to follow the guidelines set
forth in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS:
Section 84. Arbitration Award.
(1) Except as stated in sub-sections (2), (3), and (4), a valid and final award by
arbitration has the same effects under the rules of res judicata, subject to the same
exceptions and qualifications, as a judgment of a court.
(2) An award by arbitration with respect to a claim does not preclude relitigation of the
same or related claim based on the same transaction if a scheme of remedies permits
assertion of the second claim notwithstanding the award regarding the first claim.
(3) A determination of an issue in arbitration does not preclude relitigation of the same
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an employer's promulgation of a grievance or arbitration procedure
may actually lead to judicial action, rather than preclude it.42
An arbitration award may also be preclusive if the procedure
established was agreed upon by both the employer and employee after
the occurrence of the disputed event. Hence, if an employee voluntarily
and knowingly consents to a particular arbitration procedure to resolve a
specific post-event dispute, the decision of the arbitrator will properly
preclude any further judicial action which stems from the claim.4 3
Generally, in order to establish the requisite voluntary and knowing
consent, the employee must sign a release and waiver. Agreements to
submit the resolution of an employment dispute to arbitration after it has
arisen, are more likely to be enforced than pre-event agreements because
the procedural or substantive rights being waived are known at the time
of the waiver.
issue if:
(a) According preclusive effect to determination of the issue would be
incompatible with a legal policy or contractual provision that the tribunal in which the
issue subsequently arises be free to make an independent determination of the issue in
question, or with a purpose of the arbitration agreement that the arbitration be
specifically expeditious; or
(b) The procedure leading to the award lacked the elements of adjudicatory
procedure prescribed in § 83(2).
(4) If the terms of an agreement to arbitrate limit the binding effect of the award in
another adjudication or arbitration proceeding, the extent to which the award has
conclusive effect is determined in accordance with that limitation.
Id. § 84 (1982). The specific requirements for an "adjudicatory procedure" which § 84(3)(b)
mandate are set forth in § 83(2) of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS as follows:
An adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal is conclusive under the rules
of resjudicata only insofar as the proceeding resulting in the determination entailed the
essential elements of adjudication, including:
(a) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the adjudication...:
(b) The right on behalf of a party to present evidence and legal argument in
support of the party's contentions and fair opportunity to rebut evidence and argument by
opposing parties;
(c) A formulation of issues of law and fact in terms of the application of rules
with respect to specified parties concerning a specific transaction, situation, or status, or
a specific series thereof:
(d) A rule of finality, specifying a point in the proceeding when presentations are
terminated and a final decision is rendered; and
(e) Such other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the
proceeding of sufficient means of conclusively determining the matter in question,
having regard for the magnitude and complexity of the matter in question, the urgency
with which the matter must be resolved, and the opportunity of the parties to obtain
evidence and formulate legal contentions.
42. See Renny v. Port Huron Hosp., 398 N.W.2d 327. 335 (Mich. 1986) (interpreting the
promulgation of a company's grievance or arbitration procedure as a modification of the
employment-at-will relationship which accordingly permitted judicial review of the employment
relation despite the existence of such a procedure).
43. See generally Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809 F.2d 539, 540-41 (8th Cir. 1986)
(finding that a termination agreement effectively waived claims for implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing and for ADEA); Runyan v. National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1045 (6th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 850 (1986) (concluding that a post-discharge general release, which
was voluntarily executed for adequate consideration, waived any claim under the ADEA).
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D. ENFORCEMENT OF STATUTORY RIGHTS
A major source of an employee's rights emanates from state and
federal statutes which prohibit discrimination in employment on the
basis of race, creed, color, sex, age, religion, handicap, and other bases. 44
Employment-based claims which stem from an alleged violation of a
statutory provision "arise from disputes in which the public has a stake
in the outcome because such disputes typically involve enforcement of
laws designed to protect important societal interests." 45 The enforce-
ment of statutory rights can readily clash with employment agreements
which require that all employment related claims be submitted to arbitra-
tion. The fundamental issue in this realm relates to the enforceability of
prospective agreements to arbitrate employment disputes which are
based upon state or federal statutory claims and whether the arbitration
of such disputes will be an employee's exclusive remedy.
1. An Early Reluctance to Enforcement
The traditional rule regarding the enforcement of statutory claims
and prospective agreements between an employee and employer which
subjugate an employee's right to arbitration was well-settled: "[C]laims
based on federal [or state] statutes are not within the exclusive province
of arbitration and may be relitigated in a judicial forum." 46 The ration-
ale for such a hard and fast rule was premised upon the perception that
"different considerations apply where the employee's claim is based on
rights arising out of a statute designed to provide minimum substantive
guarantees to individual workers." 47 Such a view reflected the ostensible
44. James R. LaVaute, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Enforcement of Statutory Rights, 6
LAB. LAW. 107, 114 (1990). The majority of challenges to employment disciplinary actions and
terminations are based upon the violation of statutory rights. See generally Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VII, 78 Stat. 253. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988). Title VII provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 to -21 (1991 & Supp. 1995) (providing
similar state protections).
45. Jenifer A. Magyar, Case Comment, Statutory Civil Rights Claims in Arbitration: Analysis of
Gilmer v. InterstatelJohnson Lane Corp., 72 B.U. L.,REV. 641, 642 (1992). The fact "that societal
interests are at stake distinguishes statutory claims from contract claims, which typically affect only
the parties to the contract." Id.
46. Glanstein et al., supra note 9, at 810.
47. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 737 (1981).
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unwillingness of the Supreme Court to permit the compulsion of em-
ployee claims of statutory violations to be adjudicated by nonjudicial
decisionmakers. Thus, prospective agreements to arbitrate all disputes,
even where the agreement specifically provided for the arbitration of
statutory disputes, were not interpreted to include statutory claims.
48
The Supreme Court effectively erected a barrier in front of the
arbitration of federal statutory claims in the 1974 decision in Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co.49 In Alexander, the Supreme Court refused to
accord preclusive effect to the arbitral resolution of a statutory claim.50
The Court held that an employee's Title VII statutory right to a trial de
novo for a claim of discharge based on racial discrimination was not
foreclosed by the prior submission of the same claim to final arbitration,
as required by a collective bargaining agreement. 51
The plaintiff in Alexander, a discharged worker, filed a grievance
under a collective bargaining agreement in force between the plaintiff's
union and the company alleging unjust dismissal. 52 The collective
bargaining agreement contained an anti discrimination clause and
provided for a just cause standard for employee discharges. 53 The
agreement also included a broad arbitration clause which required the
arbitration of differences between union employees and the company
which covered "any trouble aris[ing] in the plant." 54 Both the compa-
ny and the union selected and paid the arbitrator whose decision was to
be final and binding on all parties.55 At the arbitration hearing, the
plaintiff claimed, for the first time, that his discharge resulted from racial
discrimination. 56 The arbitrator, after considering the employee's
allegations of racial discrimination, ruled that the plaintiff had been
"discharged for just cause." 57 After losing the arbitration, the plaintiff
initiated suit for racial discrimination and wrongful discharge in federal
court.5 8 The district court dismissed the action, finding that the employ-
ee, having voluntarily elected to pursue the final arbitration procedure
under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement,
was bound by the decision of the arbitrator and was thereby precluded
48. Mazurak, supra note 4, at 639.
49. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
50. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1974).
51. Id. at 58-60.
52. Id. at 39.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 40 (quoting the language of the agreement).
55. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 41-42.
56. Id. at 42. Prior to the arbitration hearing, the plaintiff filed a claim of racial discrimination
with the state civil rights commission, which subsequently referred the matter to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 43.
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from maintaining a cause of action against the employer in court.59 On
appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed per curiam
on the basis of the opinion of the district court.60
The issue before the Supreme Court on appeal was whether the
employee's voluntary election to pursue his claim through a binding
arbitration procedure precluded the maintenance of a subsequent cause
of action under Title VII.61 The Supreme Court held that Title VII, and
other statutory provisions, evinced a congressional intent to afford
''parallel or overlapping remedies" which allowed an individual to
independently pursue his or her rights under Title VII, as well as other
applicable federal and state statutory provisions. 62 The Court found that
Title VII was specifically designed to "supplement, rather than supplant,
existing laws" and held that the purpose and procedure of the statutory
provision suggested that "an individual does not forfeit his private cause
of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the
nondiscrimination clause of the collective-bargaining agreement." 63 In
light of the strong federal policy which underlies statutory claims, the
Court specifically declined to accord preclusive effect to arbitration
decisions, or even require an employee to exhaust arbitration proceed-
ings prior to instituting a civil suit.64 The Court reasoned that arbitral
procedures, while perhaps well suited to resolve contract disputes, were
comparatively inappropriate for the final resolution of rights created by
a federal statute. 65 The Court opined that the fact that the primary role
of the arbitrator is to effectuate the intent of the parties rather than
implement the statutory objectives of enacted legislation: "[tlhe special-
ized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the law of the shop,
not the law of the land."' 6 6  The Court further opined that the
fact-finding process of arbitration together with the informality of the
procedure employed to resolve a particular dispute, renders arbitration
comparatively inferior to the judicial process.67
59. Id. The district court, in reaching its conclusion, found significant the fact that the employee
had raised the claim of racial discrimination during the arbitration proceeding. Id. at 43 n.4.
60. Alexander. 415 U.S. at 43.
61. Id. at 38.
62. Id. at 47-48. The Court opined that the final responsibility for the enforcement of Title VII
was vested in federal courts. id. at 44.
63. Id. at 48-49.
64. Id. at 55-58. The Court held that there could be no prospective waiver of a statutory right.
Id. at 51.
65. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56.
66. Id. at 56-57.
67. Id. at 56-58. The Court noted that:
[Tihe record of the arbitration proceedings is not as complete; the usual rules of
evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil trials, such as
discovery, compulsory process. cross-examination, and testimony under oath, are often
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The Court parenthetically noted in a footnote that the "policy
reasons for rejecting the doctrines of election of remedies and waiver in
the context of Title VII are eqlually applicable to the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel." 68 Moreover, the Court, almost as an
afterthought, concluded by noting that while a federal court should
consider the claim of the employee de novo, the arbitral decision could
be admitted "as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems
appropriate ."69
Following Alexander, the nonexclusivity of arbitration for claims
based upon employer-based statutory violations had been extended by
analogy to violations of other state and federal statutory schemes.70 The
reasoning was founded on the premise that an arbitration proceeding
could not serve as an adequate substitution for a judicial trial. 7 1 Al-
severely limited or unavailable. And as this Court has recognized, "[a]rbitrators have no
obligation to the court to give their reasons for an award." Indeed, it is the informality of
arbitral procedure that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious
means for dispute resolution. This same characteristic, however, makes arbitration a less
appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than federal courts.
Id. at 57-58 (citations and footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 49 n.10.
69. Id. at 60. In a final footnote, the Supreme Court posited:
We adopt no standards as to the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision, since this
must be determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and circumstances
of each case. Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective-
bargaining agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural
fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue of
discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral
determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII rights, a court may
properly accord it great weight. This is especially true where the issue is solely one of
fact, specifically addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an
adequate record. But courts should be ever mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII,
thought it necessary to provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of
discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of
this forum.
Id. at 60 n.21 (emphasis added).
70. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 570-71 (1987) (finding that the
fact that the injury producing conduct may be subject to arbitration did not preclude a railroad
employee from bringing a cause of action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA));
McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (holding that a claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 was not precluded by an agreement to arbitrate); Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc.,
858 F.2d 1304. 1309 (8th Cir. 1988) (opining that an employee was not required to arbitrate state law
claims which were analogous to claims brought under Title VII): Wilmington v. J.1. Case Co., 793 F.2d
909. 918 (8th Cir. 1986) (indicating that an arbitral award entered in favor of an employer did not
foreclose an employee from exercising his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 in an action at law since such
statutory rights were "independent and procedurally distinct").
71. A number of courts, however, acknowledged that federal statutory claims could be subject to
exclusive arbitration if, after the event upon which the claim was based, the employee and employer
have agreed to arbitrate the particular claim. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Buerkle Buick Honda Co., 809
F.2d 539, 540-41 (8th Cir. 1987) (finding that a claim for a violation under the Age Discrimination in




though applied in a different context, the North Dakota Supreme Court
has embraced the fundamental tenets established in Alexander.72
2. A Changing Tide
Chief Justice Burger's advocacy of alternative dispute resolution as
a mechanism for the resolution of disputes, coupled with the increased
workload of the federal courts in civil matters in the 1980's, were major
catalysts behind a series of Supreme Court decisions which lead to a
marked retreat from the seemingly -steadfast and harsh position of
Alexander with respect to statutory claims.73 The judicial decisions in
this realm reveals the fact that "the Supreme Court has disavowed some
of its previous distrust of arbitrators and the arbitration process in
general ."74
In the 1991 decision of Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,75
the Supreme Court departed dramatically from the Alexander line of
labor cases and upheld the compulsory arbitration of an employee's
statutory age-discrimination claim.76 The Supreme Court's decision in
Gilmer resolved the conflict among the circuits regarding the
arbitrability of Age Discrimination in Employment Act [hereinafter
72. See Moses v. Burleigh County, 438 N.w.2d 186, 190 (N.D. 1989). The plaintiff in Moses
brought an action against the sheriff of Burleigh County for breach of an employment contract as well
as for sex and racial discrimination. Id. at 187. The trial court, although finding that Moses had
clearly proven unequal treatment, dismissed her suit and concluded that she had agreed to the
discriminatory treatment in her employment contract. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court, relying
on Alexander, reversed and concluded that a contract cannot provide for the prospective waiver of a
statutory claim. id. at 190. The court did, however, note that "a clear subsequent contract may
properly waive or settle prior discriminatory conduct." Id.
73. Robert L. Duston, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp: A Major Step Forward for
Alternative Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision?. 7 LAB. LAW. 823, 831 (1991). See also
138 CONG. Rac. E3206-03 (1992) (statement of Rep. Gunderson as he introduced a bill entitled "The
Civil Rights Dispute Resolution Act of 1992," in an effort to alleviate problems associated with the rise
in statutory claims) "Congress has to be honest with itself. It cannot continue to pass new
anti-discrimination statutes, to underfund the enforcement agencies, and then ignore the burden it has
put on the Federal court dockets." Id. at E3207.
74. Thomas H. Stewart, Comment, Arbitrating Claims Under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967: Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, I ll S. Ct. 41 (1990), 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1415, 1420 (1991). See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. Inc.. 473 U.S. 614, 640 (1985) (enforcing an agreement to arbitrate in the
commercial arena despite the existence of a substantive statutory claim).
75. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
76. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991).
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ADEA] claims 77 and represented an endorsement of arbitration as an
alternative method of resolving disputes. 78
Gilmer was an employee who was required, as a condition of his
employment with Interstate, to register as a securities representative with
various stock exchanges. 79 In order to become a registered representa-
tive, Gilmer was required to sign a contract in which he agreed to submit
any dispute that arose out of the employment to arbitration.80 Gilmer
was sixty-two years of age when Interstate terminated his employment. 8!
After filing an age discrimination charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, Gilmer brought suit in federal district court
alleging that he had been discharged in violation of the ADEA.82
Relying on the arbitration agreement which Gilmer signed, Interstate
moved to compel arbitration of the claim. 83 The district court denied
Interstate's motion based on the decision of Alexander v. Gardner-
-Denver Co. 84 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed,
finding "nothing in the text, legislative history, or underlying purposes
of the ADEA indicating a congressional intent to preclude enforcement
of arbitration agreements." 85 The Supreme Court agreed with the court
of appeals and found the claim to be arbitrable.
The Court framed its analysis by stating that "[i]t is by now clear
that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration agreement,
enforceable pursuant to the FAA."86 The Court noted that it had
previously recognized that "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a
77. Compare Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1990).
aff'd, 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (finding a compulsory arbitration agreement of ADEA claims to be
enforceable) with Nicholson v. CPC Int'l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227-28 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding that
agreements which provide for compulsory arbitration of ADEA claims to be unenforceable since
there was an "inherent conflict" between the remedial purpose of the ADEA and the enforcement of
a statutory right by an arbitrator).
78. See The American Arbitration Association Welcomes the Supreme Court's Gilmer Decision,
PR NEWSWIRE, May 14. 1991. available in LEXIS, NEWS Library, ASAPII file. Robert Coulson, 1991
President of the American Arbitration Association, welcomed the Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer
and stated that "[t]his decision ... will have a profound effect upon the business community's ability to
resolve employee disputes out of court. The Supreme Court's willingness to enforce an arbitration
agreement in a dispute between an individual employee and an employer will encourage a greater use
of alternative dispute resolution." Id.





84. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24. See supra notes 49-69 and accompanying text (discussing
Alexander).
85. Gilmer. 895 F.2d at 197.
86. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26 (noting various statutory provisions under which arbitration
agreements were held to be enforceable: the Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
RICO, and Securities Act of 1933).
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party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by statute; it only
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."
87
Gilmer argued that the social policies which underlie the ADEA are
not adequately served through compulsory arbitration because it de-
prives claimants of a judicial forum.88 The Supreme Court disagreed,
stating that the arbitration of statutory claims resolves individual disputes
as well as furthers significant social policies just as effectively as judicial
resolution. The Court cited a number of federal statutes, such as the
Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO, and the
Securities Act of 1933, that, while designed to advance important social
policies, claims thereunder were found to be appropriate for arbitration:
As "long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her]
statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to
serve both its remedial purpose and deterrent function." 89 The Court
noted that Congress did not explicitly preclude the resolution of ADEA
claims by arbitration or other nonjudicial means. 90 On the contrary, the
text of the ADEA indicated a flexible approach to the resolution of
claims:
The EEOC, for example, is directed to pursue "informal
methods of conciliation, conference, and persuasion," which
suggests that out-of-court dispute resolution such as arbitration
is consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress.
In addition, arbitration is consistent with Congress' grant of
concurrent jurisdiction over ADEA claims to state and federal
courts, because arbitration agreements, "like the provision for
concurrent jurisdiction, serve to advance the objective of
allowing [claimants] a broader right to select the forum for
resolving disputes, whether it be judicial or otherwise." 91
Gilmer raised a host of challenges to the adequacy of arbitration
procedures in arguing that arbitration was inconsistent with the ADEA:
(1) that arbitration is an inadequate remedy because arbitration panels
will be biased; (2) that arbitration's discovery rules are more limited and
87. Id. Additionally, the Court stated that "[a]lthough all statutory claims may be appropriate for
arbitration, [h]aving made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless Congress itself
has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue."'
Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,628 (1973)). The
Court noted that in this regard, the burden was on Gilmer to demonstrate that Congress intended to
preclude the waiver of a judicial forum for statutory claims. Id.
88. Id. at 27. Cf. Brief for Petitioner, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. 500 U.S. 20
(1991). No. 90-18 (LEXIS, Genfed. Library, Briefs file).
89. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
90. Id. at 29. The Court was also unpersuaded by Gilmer's argument that arbitration of statutory
claims would undermine the role of the EEOC in the enforcement of the ADEA. Id.
91. Id. (citations omitted).
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therefore make age discrimination difficult to prove; (3) that the lack of
written opinions by arbitrators makes judicial review difficult; and (4)
that arbitrators are unable to grant broad, remedial relief.92 In address-
ing these challenges, the Court noted that most of the aforementioned
arguments had been previously rejected as insufficient to preclude the
arbitration of statutory claims.93 The Court found that
[s]uch generalized attacks on arbitration "res[t] on suspicion
of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afford-
ed in the substantive law to would-be complainants," and as
such, they are "far out of step without current strong endorse-
ment of the federal statutes favoring [arbitration as a] method
of resolving disputes." 94
First, the Court stated that it refused to "indulge in the presump-
tion" that arbitrators may be biased, since the arbitration rules which
applied to the dispute in the case provide protections against biased
panels.95 The rules provided, among other things, for the overturning of
arbitration decisions where evidence of partiality or corruption exist. 96
Second, the Court believed that it was unlikely that age discrimina-
tion claims required more extensive discovery than other claims like
antitrust and RICO, which had been previously found to be arbitrable. 97
Additionally, there was no showing in the instant matter that the discov-
ery provisions, which allowed for the production of documents, subpoe-
nas, and depositions were inadequate. 98 The Court noted that although
the discovery procedures afforded by arbitration might not be as exten-
sive as those afforded by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "by
agreeing to arbitrate, a party 'trades the procedures and opportunity for
review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition
of arbitration. '"99
Finally, the Court rejected Gilmer's last two contentions since the
arbitration rules adopted required arbitration decisions to be in writing
and afforded arbitrators with the power to fashion broad, equitable
relief.l00 The argument advanced by Gilmer in support of his conten-
tion that an arbitration agreement relating to statutory claims should not
92. Id. at 29-32.
93. Id. at 29.
94. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express. Inc.,
490 U.S. 477,481 (1989)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 31.
98. Id.
99. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
100. Id. at 32.
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be an employee's exclusive remedy, rested on the principle that there
will often be unequal bargaining power between employees and employ-
ers. 101 Despite this facially appealing contention, which inures by virtue
of the employment relation itself, the Court held that mere inequality in
bargaining power was not a sufficient basis to find that arbitration
agreements are never enforceable in the employment context. 102 The
Court found Gilmer to be experienced in business and thus able to
negotiate the terms of his contract. The Court did, however, leave room
for some argument by indicating that its decision was not dispositive of
all challenges to contractual clauses based on unequal bargaining power.
This claim, opined the Court, "is best left for resolution in specific
cases." 10
3
The Supreme Court concluded that Gilmer had not met the burden
of demonstrating that Congress, in promulgating the ADEA, intended to
preclude arbitration claims which fell under the Act.104 Accordingly, the
Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit and enforced the agreement between the employer and employee
which compelled arbitration.105
The Gilmer decision is the first case in which the Supreme Court
found a statutory civil rights claim to be arbitrable. Prior to Gilmer,
compulsory arbitration agreements were only upheld by the Court in
cases involving statutory commercial claims. 106 Facially, the Gilmer
decision is a significant victory for employers-increasing the potential
for widespread utilization of arbitration clauses which cover both statuto-
ry and nonstatutory claims-even though a number of issues were left
101. ld. at 33.
102. Id. The Court noted that the purpose of the FAA was to place agreements to arbitrate on the
same footing with other contracts. Id. at 24.
103. Id. at 33.
104. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. The Court avoided overruling Alexander and its progeny by
distinguishing the two lines of cases. The dissent in Gilmer contended that the majority "skirt[ed] the
antecedent question whether the coverage of the [FAA] even extends to arbitration clauses contained
in employment contracts, regardless of the subject matter of the claim at issue." Id. at 36 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
105. Id. at 23.
106. See, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,482-83 (1989)
(holding that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 were
enforceable even though the Act contained a nonwaiver provision); Shearson/American Express, Inc.
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220. 239-41 (1987) (enforcing pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims
under RICO and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629-30 (1985) (enforcing a prospective agreement to arbitrate
antitrust claims arising under the Sherman Act). See generally Heidi M. Hellekson, Note, Taking the
"Alternative" out of the Dispute Resolution of Title VII Claims: The Implications of Mandatory
Enforcement Scheme of Arbitration Agreements Arising out of Employment Contracts, 70 N.D. L. REV.
435 (1994). The aforementioned decisions decided in the commercial context recognized a
presumption of arbitrability that favors an arbitral forum over a judicial forum when the parties
execute an agreement to arbitrate. See also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
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unanswered by the Court, such as the extent of its applicability to other
employment laws.107 The Supreme Court has, however, seemingly
signaled that Gilmer should be extended to claims under Title VII as well
as to other employment related statutes. 108 Indeed, with the demise of
the public policy exception to arbitration and the clear departure from
the historic judicial hostility towards ADR, the appropriateness of agree-
ments to arbitrate all disputes emanating from the employment relation-
ship rests on a strong legal foundation.
E. JUDICIAL REVIEW
In order to take full advantage of the benefits of the labor arbitra-
tion process, the legal system has recognized the need for finality in
employment arbitration. The relative speed, low cost, and informality of
the labor arbitration process would be seriously undermined if the
arbitration proceeding was routinely followed by an additional proce-
dural hurdle from which a binding and final ruling on the dispute
emerged. The dilemma courts confront is "that they recognize the need
to support the labor arbitration process, but are concerned that their
107. Duston, supra note 73, at 834. See Robert Layton et al., Using Compulsory Arbitration to
Resolve EEO Disputes, N.Y. LJ. (July 14, 1992), available in LEXIS/NEXIS database (discussing the
issues left open by the Court in Gilmer). See generally Robert A. Shearer, The Impact of Employment
Arbitration on Sex Discrimination Claims: The Trend toward Nonjudicial Resolution, 18 EMPLOYEE REL.
LJ. 479 (1992-93). Since Gilmer, the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all
concluded that Title VII claims are subject to compulsory arbitration. Alford v. Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991); Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305,
307 (6th Cir. 1991); Nghiem v. NEC Electronics, Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
115 S. Ct. 638 (1994); Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482, 1487 (10th
Cir. 1994); Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698,700 (11th Cir. 1992).
108. In Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), a stockbroker who
had signed a prospective agreement to arbitrate employment related disputes sued her employer
alleging Title VII violations of sexual harassment and discrimination. Id. at 229. The employer moved
to dismiss the case and argued that arbitration was the employee's exclusive remedy. Id. The district
court denied the motion and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying on Alexander, affirmed
the decision of the district court. Id. On petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court, citing Gilmer.
vacated and remanded the decision for further consideration. Id. On remand, the Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit concluded that Gilmer mandated a reversal of the district court decision and an
order compelling arbitration. Id. at 229-30.
A number of courts following Gilmer have compelled arbitration of employment related claims
arising under various statutes. See Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d
1110, 1112 (3d Cir. 1993) (relating to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)); Saari
v. Smith Barney, Harris & Upham & Co., 968 F.2d 877, 881-82 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 494
(1992) (pertaining to the Employee Polygraph Protection Act); Solomon v. Duke Univ., 850 F. Supp.
372, 373 (M.D.N.C. 1993) (addressing application to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA));
Hampton v. ITT Corp., 829 F. Supp. 202, 204 (S.D. Tex. 1993) (considering the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FSLA)). Courts. citing Gilmer, have also found employment claims rooted in state statutory and
common law doctrines to be subject to compulsory arbitration. See Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons.
Inc., 971 F.2d 698. 699 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (finding that state law claims in a sexual harassment suit
against an employer were subject to arbitration); Johnson v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 530 N.W.2d 790, 800
(Minn. 1995) (concluding that ADEA claims are, in light of Gilmer, conclusively arbitrable when
provided for in an agreement).
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support not amount to a total abdication of judicial oversight."109 In an
effort to accommodate a balance, courts generally accord preclusive
effect to the determinations made by the arbitrator10 and give substan-
tial deference to labor arbitration awards upon review.11  Judicial
intervention in the review of arbitration awards is thus significantly
circumscribed by the courts.
As an alternative to reviewing the merits of an arbitrator's award,
courts generally limit their review to the consideration of whether the
arbitrator performed the assigned role.'12 The review of an arbitrator's
adherence to performance standards does not, in theory, involve scrutiny
of the award itself.'13 The sufficiency of the evidence on which an
arbitrator bases his or her decision is likewise not a matter for judicial
review.11 4 In this regard, appeal rights do not generally parallel those
commonly found in civil litigation; errors of fact or law by the arbitrator
are usually not subject to review on appeal. This view has been em-
braced by the United States Supreme Court which has opined that since:
the parties have contracted to have disputes settled by an
arbitrator chosen by them rather than by a judge, it is the
arbitrator's view of the facts and of the meaning of the contract
that they have agreed to accept. Courts thus do not sit to hear
claims of factual or legal error by an arbitrator as an appellate
court does in reviewing decisions of lower courts. 115
As such, the substantive aspect of the arbitrator's function can
simply be viewed as the duty to interpret the arbitration agreement.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has observed that a
vacation of the arbitrator's award is appropriate:
where the award's result is one so contrary to common experi-
ence and logic that is more likely than not that such result was
not the intent of the parties, and where additional facts exist
109. Mark Berger. Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration Awards: Practices, Policies and
Sanctions, 10 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 245.248 (1992).
110. See Bryon's Constr. Co. v. North Dakota Dep't of Trans., 463 N.W.2d 660. 661 (N.D. 1990)
(holding that resjudicata barred a second arbitration of issues).
I l. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Nodak Mut. Ins. Co., 540 N.W.2d 614,617 (N.D. 1995) (opining that
it is the currently recognized general rule that arbitrators, who act and are limited by the authority
conferred upon them in a statute or contract, are the judges of both the law and the facts).
112. Berger, supra note 109, at 258.
113. Id. at 258-59.
114. See United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987) (noting that the
arbitrator's refusal to consider certain evidence was not a sufficient basis for nonenforcement of the
arbitration agreement); Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. Flint Hosiery Mills, Inc., 74 F.2d 533, 536 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 295 U.S. 748 (1935) (stating that every reasonable presumption would be indulged to
sustain an arbitration award).
115. United Paperworkers, 484 U.S. at 37-38.
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that strongly indicate that the arbitrator did not premise his
award on the contract, notwithstanding his words to the con-
trary.116
Moreover, when the arbitrator crosses the line from interpretation to
legislation, an award may and should be vacated:
[An arbitrator is confined to the interpretation and application
of the ... agreement; he does not sit to dispense his own brand
of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from
many sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it
draws its essence from the . . . agreement. When the arbitra-
tor's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have
no choice but to refuse the enforcement of the award.117
Although the scope of reviewing an arbitration award is, as previ-
ously indicated, narrow, the satisfaction of procedural fairness is a
paramount prerequisite to the enforcement of the arbitration award.
This requirement can be best reflected by the notion that "[tihere can be
no merit in immunizing from review decisions which are reached in an
unacceptable fashion."] 18 The Federal Arbitration Act as well as the
North Dakota Century Code specify the types of principles that control
when a court reviews the procedural fairness of the arbitration process.
The North Dakota Century Code, like the majority of state statutory
provisions, identifies circumstances which warrant the impeachment or
vacation of an arbitration award that generally include: evidence that the
116. George A. Hormel & Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 9, 879 F.2d 347,
350 (8th Cir. 1989). In North Dakota, an arbitrator's award will only be vacated if it can be
objectively viewed as "completely irrational." Carlson v. Farmers Ins. Group, 492 N.W.2d 579,
581-82 (N.D. 1992) (citing Byron's Constr. Co. v. State Highway Dep't, 448 N.W.2d 630, 632 (N.D.
1989)). The purpose of such a limited review and exacting standard of scrutiny has been expressed as
follows:
[T~he effect of applying the clearly irrational standard of review is to give to the
arbitrators every benefit of every doubt. It affords them the widest latitude to exercise
their authority and arrive at their decision without the customary restraints of traditional
judicial review. It is but a reflection of the strong public policy favoring the arbitration
process.
Id. at 582 (quoting Scherbenske Excavating v. North Dakota State Highway Dep't, 365 N.W.2d 485,
489 (N.D. 1985)). A decision is said to completely irrational "if it is either mistaken on its face or so
mistaken as to result in real injustice or constructive fraud." Bryon's Constr. Co. v. North Dakota
Dep't of Trans.. 463 N.W.2d 660, 662 (N.D. 1990) (citing Nelson Paving Co. v. Hjelle, 207 N.W.2d
225 (N.D. 1973)). Accord Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933
(2d Cir. 1986) (indicating that the clearly irrational standard limits judicial review on an arbitral award
to those errors that are "obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the average
person qualified to serve as an arbitrator").
117. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960). See Local 238 Int'l Bhd. v. Cargill, Inc.. 66 F.3d 988. 990 (8th Cir. 1995) (opining that the
award of the arbitrator will not be vacated as long as it is at least arguable that the arbitrator is
construing the contract and not simply furnishing his or her own brand of justice).
118. Berger, supra note 109, at 259.
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arbitrator exceeded his or her authority or was biased, an award that was
procured by fraud, corruption, or other undue means. 119
It can be gleaned from the aforementioned laundry list that courts
limit their scrutiny of the labor arbitration process and avoid
second-guessing the substantive judgment of the arbitrator. When the
parties to a dispute agree to choose an arbitrator, it is only when he or
she fails to perform the designated function, or violates his or her duty in
a fashion which is in contravention of a dominant and well-defined
public policy that the rejection of an award will be appropriate.120
It is clear that legal challenges to labor arbitration awards are not
easily made or looked upon with great favor by the judiciary:
Arbitration will not work if legal contests are its bookends: a
suit to compel or prevent arbitration, the arbitration itself, and
the suit to enforce or set aside the award. Arbitration then
becomes more costly than litigation, for if the parties had
elected to litigate their disputes they would have had to visit
court only once. 121
III. CONCLUSION
Employers and employees contemplating an alternative to the
machinery of the judicial process, would be well advised to evaluate their
respective positions carefully and, perhaps most importantly, objectively.
As judicial dockets continue to become increasingly crowded and the
costs of litigating employment disputes become more and more expen-
119. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-29.2-12 (Supp. 1995). Section 32-29.2-12 of the North Dakota
Century Code provides that the grounds for vacating an arbitrator's awards are as follows:
a. The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
b. There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption in any
of the arbitrators, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party;
c. The arbitrators exceeded their powers;
d. The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing after sufficient cause was shown to
postpone it or refused to hear evidence material to the controversy or otherwise so
conducted the hearing ... as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or
e. There was no arbitration agreement and the issue was not adversely determined in
proceedings ... and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising
the objection.
The fact that the relief was such that it could not or would not be granted by a court of
law or equity is not grounds for vacating or refusing to confirm the award.
The FAA contains a similar provision. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) (setting forth the grounds for
rehearing or vacating an arbitrator's award).
120. Berger. supra note 109, at 266-67.
121. Production & Maintenance Employees' Local 504 v. Roadmaster Corp., 916 F.2d 1161,
1163 (7th Cir. 1990). In an attempt to discourage frivolous litigation over arbitration awards, some
courts have imposed sanctions for improperly challenging claims that were previously decided during
an arbitration proceeding. MARLtN M. VoLz & EDWARD P. GommtN, How ARBITRATION WORKs 3 (4th
ed. Supp. 1985-89).
1996] 323
324 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 72:299
sive, there is mounting pressure to explore alternative methods of resolv-
ing employer-employee strife. Alternative dispute resolution, while
having many advantages and disadvantages to both the employer and the
employee, involves a number of trade-offs and is not a panacea for the
resolution of all workplace disputes. For whatever is gained, something
is lost. There is little doubt, however, that employment agreements
providing for an alternative method of dispute resolution will continue to
gain acceptance as a viable mechanism for avoiding what can often
amount to lengthy and costly litigation.
